The paper argues that society should vary sanctions applied to a criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her. This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can yield the same degree of deterrence as a uniformly applied sanction, while requiring fewer resources to be spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, as the unfairness of convicting an innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt. Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions on those who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions to vary in the way suggested.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a criminal trial in which the jury has found the defendant guilty, but where doubts concerning guilt remain. It may, for example, be difficult to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted, or believed he or she was acting, in self-defense. Should, then, the existence and the extent of the remaining doubt influence the size of the sanction? In the present system, it is generally maintained that guilt must be proven "beyond a reasonable doubt," and that once this level of certainty has been attained, the sanction should not depend on the extent of any remaining uncertainties. The question raised in this article is whether this system is socially optimal, or whether the sanction should be allowed to vary with the extent of remaining doubts or, put differently, with the certainty of guilt.
In attempting to answer this question, the first part of the article establishes a sufficient condition for it to be optimal to vary the sanction with the degree of certainty. It will be shown to be sufficient that the cost to society of imposing a sanction increases with its size. This condition will generally be fulfilled, at least for non-monetary sanctions.
1 To see why this is sufficient, note that a sanction applied to an innocent defendant does not have a deterrent effect on potential offenders ex ante, since the sanction is not applied to an offender.
2 Therefore, when the defendant's guilt is more certain, the probability that any given sanction will be "wasted" on an innocent person is smaller, and a higher sanction therefore yields more deterrence per sanctioning cost (e.g. , per year of imprisonment).
The second part of the article demonstrates that including fairness as a social concern provides a further rationale for varying sanctions with the probability of guilt. There are two countervailing forces. On the one hand, sanctioning an innocent defendant is not only a waste in terms of its effect on deterrence, but also unfair to the defendant, and the more unfair the greater the sanction. This is an argument for varying sanctions. On the other hand, if considerations of fairness call for a given level of punishment (as the "fair" level), this provides a rationale for not varying sanctions. Of these two forces, it will be shown that the former wins out, 3 and that considerations of overall fairness therefore provide a rationale for varying sanctions with the weight of the evidence.
The article is structured as follows. Before introducing and analyzing the model, related literature is discussed; some objections will be discussed after the analysis, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions to people who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it admits that it bases its verdicts on probabilistic evidence rather than on certainty and "proof." Implications for legal practice will also be briefly discussed. The article ends with a conclusion.
THE LITERATURE
The general idea that sanctions should depend on certainty of guilt has not (to my knowledge) been addressed directly in the literature. The following literature is related. Miceli (1990) analyzes the optimal levels of three variables: standard of proof, level of enforcement effort, and size of the sanction, given that society cares about avoiding errors of both type 1 (convicting the innocent) and type 2 (acquitting the guilty). Miceli takes for granted that there is a threshold of certainty above which a uniform sanction should be applied, and below which no sanction is applied. Thus, while Miceli shows that the uniformly applied sanction for a given type of crime should be affected by the risk of convicting innocent defendants (given the optimal standard of proof), he does not address the question of whether a sanction applied to one defendant should be higher than that applied to another, if the evidence against one is stronger than against the other.
4 Shavell (1987) shows that liability in tort cases should, for optimal internalization of harm, be proportional to the probability of causation. Shavell's model can be illustrated by a polluting factory, to which can be attributed (in a probabilistic sense) 40 out of 100 deaths from lung cancer in a given neighborhood, but not any single individual's death. Shavell's result that the factory should (in the absence of certain administrative concerns) be held liable for 40% of the compensation for each individual's death, hinges on the observation that this rule provides a correct internalization of the harm incurred by the pollution. In contrast, in the model in this paper, harm is certain to occur, and the reason for graduating sanctions is to save on either sanctioning costs or on unfairness costs, not to equate the expected sanction with the expected harm. The two approaches describe two different situations: one where the effect of an action can be measured only inaccurately and the other where the identity of the wrong-doer cannot be determined with certainty. Still, the results are related and complementary. Andreoni (1991) explains why higher sanctions may lower deterrence: the jury may want to acquit when the sanction is harsh, for fear of sanctioning an innocent person harshly. In contrast to this paper, Andreoni assumes that the sanction is given and cannot be varied with the amount of evidence. Schauer and Zeckhauser (1996) argue that standards of proof, as applied in diverse domains of decision-making throughout society, should depend on the sanction that follows from an adverse decision. If the sanction is ten years in prison, the standard of proof should be higher than if the sanction is being fired from a job. Although closely related, this point is different from the points made in the present article: Schauer and Zeckhauser argue that the standard of proof should vary with the sanction; this paper argues the converse, that the sanction should generally depend on the degree of certainty concerning guilt.
The present model extends their framework in this dimension.
In the model it will be assumed that one kind of criminal act causes harm, h, to society. Potential criminals are assumed to be risk neutral, and will only commit the crime if the benefit, v, is greater than the expected sanction. The total population is normalized to one, and the fraction of the population with benefit v is given by the density function z (v) 0, and the cumulative distribution function Z (v). It will be assumed that whenever a criminal act has been committed, somebody will report it to the police, who will investigate and press charges if there is sufficient evidence. The evidence generated through investigations and court proceedings will be stochastic, and may be more or less incriminating. It will be assumed that the judge/jurors can rank the evidence in this respect, and that the ranking can be expressed by a continuous variable x ∈ 0,, where the more conclusive the evidence, the higher the number. Furthermore, it will be assumed that when the issue arises of whether to sanction and by how much, this choice concerns only one individual, who will be termed the "prime suspect." The implicit assumption here is that criminal sanctions only apply when the (subjective) probability of guilt is above 1 2 , which cannot be the case for more than one suspect in a given crime, given the assumption that only one individual commits each crime. Two probability funtions are central to the analysis: how likely it is that some level of evidence x will arise against the actual perpetrator, and how likely it is that it will arise against someone other than the perpetrator. Denote these joint probabilities f g (x) and f i (x), respectively. In Appendix A, these probabilities are derived from a model where the Bayesian updating is transparent. As derived at the end of this appendix, the conditional (subjective) probability of guilt given the evidence, prob (g|x), can be expressed from f g (x) and f i (x) as:
Note that since the evidence is ordered in such a way that a higher x means a higher probability of guilt, If the sanction is s (x) and the level of utility for which a person will be exactly deterred is
is then the law-abiding and 1-Z (  v) the criminal part of the population.
For reasons to which we will return, it is natural to imagine policies where s (x) is zero for low values of x and only increasing thereafter, but the analysis will not be restricted to such policies.
We now address whether sanctions should be varied when society only cares about achieving deterrence at low sanctioning costs. Subsequently, the consequences of adding fairness considerations will be analyzed.
THE CASE OF COSTLY SANCTIONS WITHOUT CONCERN FOR FAIRNESS
It will now be assumed that the cost, c, of sanctioning a defendant, whether guilty or innocent, depends on the size of the sanction, which again may depend on the level of certainty concerning guilt, i.e.: cc (s (x)). Note that when sanctioning is costly, Becker's result (1968) that maximal penalties are optimal (because the maximal penalty economizes on enforcement effort) does not apply.
The cost of sanctioning may include the loss of utility of the convicted, as well as the cost to society of incarcerating an individual, but it does not include the sense of unfairness, which an unfairly convicted individual is likely to feel (or which others may feel on his or her behalf).
Social welfare is maximized when total social costs SC are minimized with respect to s (x). SC can be written:
The following proposition can now be proven:
Proposition 1 -When sanctions are costly and not just a transfer (in terms of social welfare), a constant sanction is dominated by a sanction that increases with x.
Proof: see Appendix B.
The point is simply that sanctions deter more when applied to the guilty than when applied to the innocent. As a consequence, a higher sanction may be justified when it is highly certain that the defendant is guilty, but may not be justified when there is less certainty. To illustrate this point, consider two kinds of evidence that may come forth in criminal proceedings: one involving DNA evidence and the other involving only witness testimony. Assume that the two kinds of evidence establish a probability of the prime suspect's guilt of .99 and .9, respectively, and assume further that for each of the two kinds of evidence, the probability that it will be produced in a criminal proceeding after a given type of crime has been committed is .2. While the two kinds of evidence by assumption appear equally often in court, one (DNA evidence) is more likely to arise against the actual offender than the other (witness testimony), which means that sanctioning when DNA evidence is present yields a greater deterrent effect than sanctioning when the evidence is eyewitness testimony. Thus, if the sanction for both kinds of evidence is three years imprisonment, 8 the effect on the expected sanction for the offender is given by:
If, instead, the sanction is five years when the evidence is DNA, and one year when it is eyewitness testimony, the effect on the expected sanction for the offender is given by:
In this example, the expected sanction is approximately 3% higher when sanctions are varied, while sanctioning costs are identical if sanctioning costs are proportional to the length of the sanction.
This raises two issues. First, the main argument presupposes, as mentioned, that potential offenders realize that the sanction may be applied to an innocent person, i.e., it is assumed that the policy pursued by the courts is reflected (to some extent at least) in the expectations of potential offenders.
9 Second, it has been implicitly assumed that convicting the innocent does not have a negative impact on deterrence. This assumption is discussed in Lando (2005) ; the argument is that if a person decides not to commit a crime such as murder, assault or theft, the likelihood of that person being innocently convicted for the specific crime is non-existent, since if the person does not commit the crime, there will be no victim and no trial. The potential offender may be innocently convicted of other crimes, but this risk exists whether or not he or she commits the crime in question. 
THE CASE WHERE FAIRNESS IS A CONCERN
The policy of graduating sanctions is further warranted when fairness is a social concern. Fairness considerations may play a role in two senses. In one sense, fairness implies that the sanction should not be applied to innocent defendants, and naturally, in this sense, fairness would call for varying sanctions with the degree of certainty concerning guilt. In another sense, the sanction should be in proportion to the harm caused by the crime or to the malicious intent, or to some other aspect of the crime committed. In this sense, fairness would generally call for a uniform sanction -the correct level of punishment for the given criminal act. It will now be shown that when both these senses of fairness are taken into account, the overall effect is for graduated sanctions.
In the first sense, the cost of sanctioning the innocent will be expressed by the function  (s), and may include not only c (s) and the convicted but innocent defendant's sense of unfairness, but also society's dislike for sanctioning unfairly, based on sympathy with the innocent defendant who is wrongly convicted. In the second sense, the benefit of sanctioning the guilty can be expressed as a function Q (s). c (s) may be incorporated in Q (s), in which case the benefit Q (s) may be negative, if the cost of sanctioning is higher than the fairness benefit. The fairness benefit may be increasing in s, when s is at a low level, and decreasing in s, when s is at a high level, as noted by Polinsky and Shavell (2000) .
The social fairness cost of applying
) is the number of crimes, f i (x) is the probability of observing x against an innocent person and f g (x) is the probability of observing x against the guilty person. The social cost of applying the policy s (x) overall can then be expressed as: Proof: see Appendix C. The idea of the proof can be illustrated as in the example given above. If the sanction for the given offense is three years, and, say, four years is considered the fair sanction by most people (or four years is the median preference), applying a sanction of five years of incarceration to defendants who are believed to be guilty with 99% certainty, and a sanction of one year to those whose guilt is only 90% certain, would entail a loss in terms of going both above and below the fair sanction (assuming that the defendant is guilty), rather than being consistently below the fair sanction. For small graduations around three years (e.g., imposing three and a half years for the former group and two and half years for the latter), the extra cost in terms of not sanctioning the guilty at the correct level is likely to be low, since the effect of increasing the sanction tends to cancel the effect of decreasing it (at least when preferences are differentiable). On the other hand, if the cost of sanctioning an innocent person is one unit per year of imprisonment, graduating the sanctions in the way suggested incurs a total expected cost in terms of this kind of unfairness of 0.01 5  0.1 1  .15 rather than 0.01 3  0.1 3  .33. In this example, the unfairness cost is more than halved when sanctions are graduated.
Summing up, there are two main motives for graduating sanctions with the degree of certainty concerning guilt. The first is that sanctioning the innocent is a waste in terms of deterrence, while the other is that sanctioning the innocent is unfair.
DISCUSSION
Four objections against graduating sanctions seem particularly worth discussing.
First, it may be viewed as unfair to apply different sanctions to people who have in fact committed the same offense. However, it should be realized that people may already be sanctioned differently for the same offense. For example, some are acquitted altogether while others receive a harsh penalty for identical offenses, and it is not obvious that this is more fair than a system of graduated sanctions.
Second, it may be argued that the legal system will lose legitimacy and respect if it admits that sanctions are based on probabilistic evidence rather than on certainty or "proof." The argument is that legitimacy is enhanced by public understanding that the convicted are (as good as) certain to be guilty, since this gives the impression that the system is able and dedicated to finding the truth, and does not sanction people in a superficial manner. However, the extent to which legitimacy exists and would be impaired by graduated sanctions is not clear; it seems worth further study. Thus, it is probably generally understood that the legal system cannot avoid making mistakes. This understanding is reflected, for example, in the common opinion that the death penalty should only be applied (if at all) when the certainty of guilt is very high, which reveals an understanding that not all sanctions-not even long prison sentences-are based on certainty.
Third, it may perhaps also be argued that graduating sanctions may affect the strategies and incentives to search for evidence of both defense lawyers and prosecutors. However, it is not obvious what the effect will be. One conceivable effect is that when the sanction depends (continuously) on the weight of the evidence, this might provide an incentive for defense lawyers and prosecutors to search for marginal evidence that under a standard of proof system would not be searched for because it is not critical to whether the weight of the evidence is below or above the standard. However, whether incentives will be negatively or positively affected, how this will affect the f g and f i functions, and whether the overall effect will be to increase or decrease welfare, must be left to future research.
11
Fourth, one can argue that criminal sanctions serve as a social stigma, and that for this to work, it must be clear to people what they can infer from a verdict. However, while this objection may call for some threshold probability of guilt as a condition for applying any sanction at all, it does not refute the idea that it may be worth sanctioning more a person who is guilty with 99% certainty than a person who is guilty with 95% probability. A threshold of evidence below which a defendant is acquitted is likely to be optimal, if for no other reason than because a trial is costly and will not be worth its cost if the sanction is very low.
Beyond these objections, it may be argued that a policy of graduating sanctions will have repercussions on existing legal practice. Two points are worth making here.
On one hand, the present system already graduates sanctions to some extent. First, it may well be that judges, when determining the sanction, are sometimes affected by the degree to which they remain in doubt after the defendant has been found guilty.
12
Second, a defendant may be convicted in a tort suit and acquitted in a criminal trial.
13 When both kinds of trials are a possibility, the sanction increases stepwise with the weight of the evidence, first when the standard of tort law is met (preponderance-of-the-evidence), and again when the The Size of the Sanction / 285 standard of criminal law is met (beyond-a-reasonable-doubt). Although this is different from letting the sanction increase continuously with the weight of the evidence, as suggested in this paper, it is worth noting that the main rationale given for applying a different standard in tort and criminal law is the same as that which underlies this paper, namely that the harsher the sanction, the more unfair is convicting the innocent.
14 Third, legal systems that rely on plea bargaining (mainly the American) are likely to produce sanctions that are weighted by the probability of conviction, i.e., by the certainty of guilt.
15 Thus, the use of graduating sanctions does not seem incompatible with existing practices.
On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that a general policy of graduating sanctions may interfere with other aims and institutions of the legal system. For example, allowing the judge to graduate sanctions adds to the judge's discretion, which legislators often seek to lower (e.g., through Sentencing Guidelines).
16 There is also the procedure of first establishing guilt and then determining whether the sanction may need to be revised, should the size of the sanction become connected to the weight of the evidence. However, determining the optimal sanctioning policy in the presence of these complicating factors is beyond the scope of the present analysis, and is left for future research.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown that, under weak conditions, it is optimal to vary sanctions with the degree of certainty concerning guilt. While it is likely to be optimal, for reasons that were mentioned but not fully analyzed, not to sanction at all when the probability of guilt is below a certain threshold, the point is that beyond this threshold, it will increase both deterrence and fairness to graduate sanctions. Arguably, sanctions are already graduated to some degree in reality, when judges and jurors are apprehensive about sanctioning an innocent person harshly, but judges and jurors seem constrained by the conventional view that it is inappropriate to adjust sanctions. The present analysis goes against this conventional view in suggesting that, at a fundamental level, a policy of graduating sanctions with the weight of the evidence is welfare enhancing.
This appendix constructs a simple model where a court updates its beliefs about a defendant's guilt in a Bayesian fashion. The purpose is to provide a foundation for the two main concepts f g (x) and f i (x).
Let there be four individuals, A, B, C and D. For each crime committed, the court will know that one of them did it, but will not, before evidence is produced, know anything about who of them is guilty, since individual characteristics are not known to the court. We model this by assuming that, from the perspective of the court, nature draws one of the four by chance, meaning that each will be drawn with a probability of . When evidence x is produced against a person who then becomes the prime suspect, the court seeks to infer the conditional probability of guilt given x. To calculate this probability, the court can estimate the probabilities of two states of the world:
x is collected and the suspect is guilty x is collected and the suspect is not guilty Note that these are not conditional probabilities, but instead concern the joint occurrence of x and guilt, or x and innocence. Denote the former by prob (x ∩ g) and the latter by prob (x ∩ i). Note that they sum to the probability of x being produced, prob (x).
To illustrate how the f g and f i functions can be derived, assume first that nature picks A. When A has committed the crime, there is some probability that the evidence x will arise against him. Denote this probability by f A (x against A) where the subscript refers to A having committed the crime. Given that nature picks A to commit the crime with probability 1 4 , the probability of the event:
the evidence forthcoming against A is x and A is guilty
and if we denote this common, conditional probability by f g (x), we can infer, using the formula prob (x∩g)  prob (x|g)  prob (g), that the probability of the event x is forthcoming and the prime suspect is guilty is given by 4 f g ( x)
; the joint probability is
The Size of the Sanction / 287 equal to the conditional for each of the four potential offenders.
We use prob (x∩i) to denote the probability that if A commits the crime, either B, C or D become prime suspects, or similarly, that if B commits it, one of the other three becomes the prime suspect, etc. If the probability that B, C or D becomes the prime suspect when A has committed the murder is the same, and we denote it by f iA ( x), the probability of the event that A commits the murder and somebody else becomes the prime suspect equals
. The same analysis applies to the case where one of the other three commits the murder, and so, assuming symmetry (i.e., It should be clear that functions f g ( x) and f i ( x) can be derived in a similar way for any number N of potential offenders.
17
Note that since prob (x ∩ g)  f g ( x) , and prob (x ∩ i)  f i ( x), and prob ( x g)  prob ( x ∩ i)  prob ( x), since the prime suspect is either guilty or innocent, the conditional probability prob ( g|x)  in criminal cases, and since it does not then lower the standard by much, this aspect of fairness may not be as important as unfair conviction. 15. This consequence of plea bargaining is sometimes deplored, whereas the present analysis suggests that it may be welfare enhancing. 16. In the case of the U.S., the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (http://www.ussc.gov/1998guid/tabcon98.htm) define sanctions for each crime depending on the circumstances of the crime, mitigating factors, etc. 17. While it may seem that the function (N-1) f i ′ , which above becomes 3 f i ′ , will be increasing in N, note that the f i ′ function will decrease (correspondingly) with the number of individuals, as more individuals share the risk of innocent conviction.
